I see this morning that the UK has finally limped out of recession with a startlingly low 0.1% growth, that after the usual revisions might not even be real. As the Bank of England continues with Quantitative Easing, AKA running the printing presses, this level of growth is spectacularly poor. Where is the growth coming from? Well, the main growth area was the public sector. Anyone else see a problem with that?
I've been suffering a bit of doomers block on this one, but here's what I see coming, and it ain't cheerful, as far as I understand it.
When the banks damn near tanked, there were two main policy efforts. Firstly, pump huge amounts of government money into the banks, to hold them up day to day. Second, pump huge amounts of imaginary money into the bond markets via the previously mentioned Quantitative Easing.
Now, that's pretty much what everyone one did, whether you were sucking at the tit of the taxpayer, or the IMF, really depended on how bad your situation was or is.
So, banks are okay now, right? Well, no, not really. They didn't collapse, but they are still in a real mess. The balance sheets that they need to repair are getting hit in three ways:
Firstly, the money that they do have has to be paid back at some point, after all it has been taken from someone to be given to someone else, with the bank taking a skim on the process. (That's what banking is, so I'm fine with that.) Issue is when do you have to give it back? If it is a bond, the payments may run for a decade or even several decades, so you do not have to give back the money anytime soon, although you do pay (very little at the moment) interest on it. However, a lot of money at the moment is short term, because people are not going to lend you long term cash at what has to be the lowest interest rates in the West since, well more or less, ever. Quite reasonably, I want to get it back in a year, so that I might lend it to you again, but not at that low interest rate if I can avoid it.
None other than the IMF are commenting on this at the moment.
"The IMF also warned that banks face "a wall of maturities looming ahead
through 2011–13" in their shorter-term funding. It added: "A
future retrenchment in confidence therefore could severely weaken banks'
ability to roll over this debt."
In other words the banks have less capital, and have to reign in lending, but also may not have the assets to covering the lending they already have. Sound obscure? It is exactly this problem of long term lending and short term assets that did in Northern Rock.
Secondly, the Tin Foil Hat crowd's favourite bank, the Bank for International Settlements, is looking at how to realign the Basel II accord which is the global framework for ensuring that no bank could ever pose a systemic or major credit risk by setting a prudent and well thought out set of rules for making banks reserve capital to cover all their potential defaulters and other sundry problems.
First draft worked a treat, didn't it? RBS, Hypo Real Estate, Bank of Ireland, etc.
So now, they are going to introduce a bunch of additional measures that will demand extra capital to be reserved on the balance sheet. How much? Barclays Bank reckons it will need about 17 billion more in capital to match the likely requirements.
"Banking analysts recently estimated that Barclays would need to raise an extra
£17bn in capital to comply with the new rules, with other banks facing
similarly large bills. With some insiders suggesting that even the new
stricter Basel rules on capital do not go far enough, the potential cost
could be higher still."
But who is going to lend them the money? Shareholders might be feeling a bit tapped out at the moment, and the shares are beginning to look expensive to many people already. Also, the last thing that the governments want is the massive contraction in lending that a major bank capital accumulation might require.
Finally, to compound both of the above problems, the suddenly deeply unpopular President Obama has taken to the idea of lynching a few banks to try and get the trampled American masses back on his side. The Volcker Rule, as laid out in the 30 billion dollar speech, so called because that's how much bank shares declined on the news, aims to get rid of the idea of banks making profits trading on their own behalf.
Basically, it would mean that all bank activities would have to serve a client purpose, and not just to enrich the bank. Seems sensible on the face of it, but one thing is also clear, it will reduce bank profitability, and while that may sound Okay in this morally outraged climate, it also means that banks would have to take longer to get back to being sound, as they have less incoming money to stuff into the holes in the balance sheet.
So banks will have less capital, well, won't we just do what we are doing now, and stuff government cash into them so that they can go on?
Well, no, because even governments have to get the money from somewhere. Oftentimes its the poor taxpayer who can be fleeced, and that's going to happen. London and New York have already seen the tax hits coming. Second option is to borrow from people who have money, but right now, if you have cash, as already mentioned, you don't really want to tie it up at the current low returns, so you will be reluctant to lend. China is showing signs of weariness, and Japan, as we shall see, is about to be out of the picture as a global lender. Which is why some countries are finding it hard to float off bond sales. Finally, you can print it up using the QE that has already been mentioned.
But here's the rub. In saving the banks and the financial markets, the sovereign countries of the world have taken on the banks bad debt, and made it sovereign bad debt. For the first time in a while, people are seriously discussing sovereign default, e.g. where a country reneges on its debts. The last major one was Argentina, in 2003. There are others, my honeymoon location of choice the Seychelles being one of them.
So, it can happen.
But not the big ones, right?
Wrong, it might seem. Read this absolutely brilliant, if rather nerve wracking, article by John Rubino on the current state of Japan. He thinks that even a minor uptick in the interest rates would put Japan into a debt compound trap, where it cannot make the payments, and so people start anticipating default, and so charge more interest, literally compounding the problem.
"The gist of the argument is that Japan is heading for a “debt trap,”
which will unfold as follows: When its pool of domestic savings runs
out (as it will in the coming year) the Japanese government will be
forced to borrow from foreign investors, who will doubt its ability to
pay and demand a higher interest rate. As billions in short term paper
roll over at ever-higher rates, interest costs will rise, requiring
even more borrowing, which causes investors to demand even higher
rates, and so on, until it dawns on the markets that this is a
self-reinforcing cycle. Buyers scatter, rates spike, the economy
crashes, game over."
He sees three outcomes, one is that the market more or less self corrects, minus the smoking wreck of Japan, the other two are less good. Either the whole sovereign credit systems seizes up, or the banks do a QE storm to buy up the troubled flow, and end up hyperinflating a la Zimbabwe.
Its not just Japan, Eurozone has the PIIGS, the UK is borrowing like crazy, and the USA has its own problems.
So, if I have to make a prediction for 2010 its that we are going to see at least one major sovereign in big difficulty, if not in actual default. First time a big one cannot get a bond auction away, then we will see what happens.
Or to quote Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian school of economics:
"There is no means of avoiding a final collapse of a boom brought about
by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should
come sooner as a result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit
expansion or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency
system involved."
Enjoy the show, you've paid a lot for the ticket.